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Real Judicial Restraint
JoelAlicea

L

AST NOVEMBER, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY gathered in

Washington, D.C, to mark its thirtieth anniversary at its annual
convention. This was no ordinary assembly. The conservative legal
movement came together to celebrate three decades of astonishing success in changing the way judges, lawyers, scholars, and citizens think
about the law. But it also met in the aftermath oi National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius and ChiefJustice John Roberts's opinion
upholding the President's health-care law.
Both before and during the conference, conservative legal scholars
were sharply divided about the decision. Some conservatives saw it as a
model of judicial restraint and praised the ChiefJustice for leaving questions of self-government up to the electorate. Other conservatives saw it as
an abdication ofthe judicial duty to enforce the limits ofthe federal government's enumerated powers. Still more legal conservatives—especially
those of a libertarian bent — thought Roberts had sanctioned the
health-care law's unjust violation of individual rights.
The NFIB decision exposed divisions in the conservative legal movement that have existed for decades. Legal conservatism has long stood for a
modest judicial role that tends to defer to current legislative majorities. But
legal conservatism has also stood for originalism, the idea that judges should
enforce the original meaning of the Constitution and its amendments.
When opposing the fabrication of constitutional rights by judges, judicial
restraint and originalism have reinforced one another. As the reaction to
ChiefJustice Roberts's opinion in NFIB demonstrated, however, some originalists think judicial restraint permits the elected branches to do things the
founding generation never could have imagined, let alone ratified.
JOEL ALICEA is a law clerkforjudge Diarmuid F. O'ScannlainoftheU.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. The views expressed here are wholly his own.
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As these tensions have become increasingly apparent in recent years,
legal conservatives have evinced significant disagreement over the future of their movement and the place of judicial restraint within it.
The disagreement centers on two questions: What is judicial restraint'
And should the conservative legal movement affirm it? The answers to
these questions must be understood through the prism of originalism,
which for better or worse is the default theory of legal conservatism. The
principal contenders for control over the movement's future all claim
as their foundation the conviction that judges must enforce the original
meaning of the Constitution. So does originalism demand judicial restraint, or is originalism undermined by such restraint'
THE ORIGINS OF ORIGINALISM

As a historical matter, it is quite striking that the conservative legal
movement is seriously rethinking its dedication to judicial restraint.
That principle has been a pillar of legal conservatism since the late
judge Robert Bork launched the modern originalist project in a 1971
Indiana Law Journal article entitled "Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems." Bork's intellectual inspiration for originalism
was the work of his friend and fellow Yale law professor Alexander
Bickel, who forcefully advocated judicial restraint. Bickel famously emphasized that "when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a
legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives ofthe actual people ofthe here and now." He called the
problem of unelected judges overturning a democratically enacted law
the "counter-majoritarian difficulty."
Bork's analytical framework started from similar premises. The
American constitutional system, according to Bork, recognizes that
both majorities and minorities can be tyrannical, and it guards against
abuses by both. Seduced by its own power, the majority can craft legislation that invades "the areas properly left to individual freedom." A
minority, on the other hand, may attempt to thwart the majority's exercise of its rule "where its power is legitimate." By balancing majoritarian
and counter-majoritarian interests, the constitutional system is meant to
solve this problem, which Bork called the "Madisonian Dilemma." But
it always confronts the question of how to define the legitimate bounds
of both majority power and minority protections. Bork believed that
society had entrusted the courts with the duty of judicial review—and
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its attendant power to invalidate legislation — precisely to articulate
these boundaries.
According to Bork, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl
Warren had articulated illegitimate boundaries in its eagerness to recognize new constitutional rights. Bork argued that the Supreme Court was
given its power by the Constitution, and the Constitution owed its legitimacy to the consent of the people. Judges, in order to serve the people,
were therefore bound to use the Constitution as their guide in determining when majorities should rule and when their power should be limited.
Judicial review in the style of the Warren Court, based as it was on the
justices' "own moral views," amounted to "claim[ing] for the Supreme
Court an institutionalized role as perpetrator of limited coups d'etat."
Bork's concern was that judicial power—like all power — could
be misused. Originalism was his way of solving this problem. He believed that, by rooting judicial review in the original meaning of the
Constitution, judges would be applying principles and rules ratified and
amended by the people themselves. They would apply "certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of
majorities by, the Constitution." Bickel's counter-majoritarian difficulty
would disappear—or so Bork argued.
Thus, the dawn of the conservative legal movement came after the
night of the Warren Court, and given this context it makes sense that
originalism and judicial restraint were rhetorically and intellectually
intertwined. The niovement Bork inspired set a high threshold for the
exercise of judicial review, perhaps higher than Bork himself intended.
The movement combined Bork's originalism with an aversion to striking
down popular enactments: Originalism would guide judges in determining when an act was unconstitutional, but the Court would intervene
only where the act's unconstitutionality was beyond question.
In insisting on this level of restraint, the movement took its cue from
the 19th-century legal theorist James Bradley Thayer, who argued that
judicial review was only appropriate "when those who have the right to
make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear
one, — so clear that it is not open to rational question." This Thayerian
principle was echoed eloquently in Justice John Marshall Harlan's
dissent in Lochner v. New York, a 1905 case striking down New York's
maximum-hour law for bakers. Harlan argued that a statute had to be
"plainly and palpably unauthorized" to be held unconstitutional, and
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he saw no basis for the Court's willingness to strike down the New York
maximum-hour statute. The Supreme Court renounced Lochner in 1937
in the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, and Lochner soon became
synonymous with judicially manufactured rights.
Given the conservative legal movement's affinity for Thayerian judicial restraint, it was no coincidence that its early exponents frequently
drew an analogy between the decisions in Lochner and the 1965 case
Griswold V. Connecticut., the landmark Warren Court decision recognizing a right of married couples to use contraception. Indeed, Bork's
"Neutral Principles" explicitly likened the two cases and said there was
"no justification for the Court's methods" in either. For Bork and other
early advocates of originalism, decisions like Griswold were nothing
more than the resurrection oí Lochner, this time employed for the cause
ofthe sexual revolution rather than economic laissez faire.
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES

Bork's theory, like those of most of his originalist descendants, grounds
judicial review in the will of the sovereign people. Princeton professor Keith Whittington has explained that popular-sovereignty theories
like Bork's implicitly distinguish between the people's acting in their
sovereign capacity and the people's acting in ordinary politics. This
distinction is critical. When the people act in their sovereign capacity
by creating or amending a constitution, they engage in a form of lawmaking that is higher than ordinary legislating: The popular sovereign
imposes limits on its own power, structuring when, how, and by whom
that power can be exercised. In this way, the Constitution guides and
restricts day-to-day politics.
When the people act in ordinary politics, on the other hand, they do
not do so in their sovereign capacity. Their daily political actions are of a
different kind, which is the necessary consequence of having a popularly
approved constitution that structures and limits ordinary politics. If the
everyday activities of legislating were acts of the sovereign, then each
piece of legislation would be equivalent to a constitutional amendment,
and the enterprise of constitutionalism would be pointless. Adherence
to a constitution vindicates the people's power to act in their sovereign
capacity by respecting the restrictions they put in place.
Conversely, ignoring a constitution reduces all lawmaking to ordinary politics and deprives the popular sovereign of the power to
72.
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structure political action. Abolishing the people's ability to act as sovereign is dangerous for several reasons. First, by reducing all action to
the domain of everyday politics, it renders the structures of governance
a matter of convenience, open to change as political winds dictate. It
would, to quote Federalist No. 49, "deprive the government ofthat veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which perhaps
the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability." Such an abdication of the constitutional structure would threaten
ordered government and ordered liberty.
Second, it puts the rights and duties recognized by positive law up to
a continuous majority vote, raising the specter of majority tyranny. As
Alexis de Tocqueville argues in Democracy in America, liberty is imperiled when power confronts no obstacle; it does not matter whether that
power is a monarch or a majority.
Third, as Whittington points out, when the distinction between sovereign rule and everyday politics collapses, it has the effect of shifting
the locus of sovereignty from the people to their government. As the
people grow accustomed to seeing their elected representatives exercise
sovereign functions on their behalf, they and their representatives soon
lose sight of who the sovereign is. When government, rather than the
people, becomes sovereign, meaningful restrictions on its power become difficult to theorize, as Blackstone acknowledged when he said of
the British system: "True it is, that what the Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo."
The Constitution is rooted in the principle that sovereignty justly
resides in the people and not the government. The people as sovereign
have established the Constitution to set limits on government power,
and this necessarily means limiting their own ability to act when they
engage in ordinary—as opposed to constitutional — politics. Whenever
the judiciary is presented with a dispute involving a conflict between
ordinary politics and the sovereign will, the judiciary has the authority and duty to act on the people's behalf, overrule the majority of the
moment, and vindicate the limits the sovereign people have imposed
on themselves.
This basis for judicial review was the one sketched by Chief Justice
John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. But, as Marshall recognized, such
a theory makes sense only if the will of the sovereign people as enacted in the Constitution trumps the will of current majorities. If it
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does not, there can be no basis for judicial review, and no point to it. As
Marshall argued.
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time,
be passed by those intended to be restrained.' The distinction
between a government with limited and unlimited powers is
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom
they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of
equal obligation.
If judges derive their duty and power of review from the ability ofthe
popular sovereign to set limits on majoritarian action, then it follows
that any deviation from those limits must be prevented. To do otherwise
would be to make ordinary legislative or executive actions the equivalent
of constitutional revisions, to render a written constitution meaningless,
and to shift the locus of sovereignty to government.
THE LIMITS OF THAYER

In the decades since Bork wrote his article, Thayerian judicial restraint has fallen out of favor with most originalists. And rightly so:
Originalism's grounding in the will ofthe people puts it in tension with
Thayer's approach to judicial restraint.
Thayerian judicial restraint is most salient where one can offer a nonfrivolous interpretation ofthe Constitution to uphold a law, but the judge
believes that the interpretation, though not obviously wrong, is nonetheless
incorrect. A Thayerian judge, loyal as he is to the principle of not striking
down the will ofthe majority unless its unconstitutionality is "not open
to rational question," would uphold the law under these conditions.
But few matters in constitutional law are obvious, and originalists
can and do disagree about original meaning. The weight of historical
materials might point toward one interpretation, but that does not
make another interpretation frivolous. Few challenges could meet the
Thayerian criterion, and a great many laws that the Court in its best
judgment believes to be unconstitutional would thus be upheld. When
this occurs, the Court abandons the duty that authorizes judicial review
in the first place: to guard the limits of governmental power when a
concrete dispute requires that those limits be enforced.
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More fundamentally, the idea of Thayerian judicial restraint implicitly privileges ordinary politics over the sovereign will. Thayer is
prepared to countenance violations ofthe sovereign will (where those violations are not obvious) out of deference to current majorities. In their
focus on the counter-majoritarian difficulty, advocates of Thayerian judicial restraint turn away from the will of the sovereign people. The
distinction between constitutional and ordinary politics collapses.
Perversely, in its efforts to respect current majorities, the Court may
actually assign more power to itself. When the Court takes a highly
deferential posture toward popular enactments, it will do all it can
to avoid invalidating legislation, even to the point of giving laws implausible interpretations to avoid ruling them unconstitutional. This is
the principal criticism leveled against Chief Justice Roberts's opinion
in NFIB by many legal conservatives. The Chief Justice's adoption of
Thayerian judicial restraint led him to interpret language that he conceded most naturally requires the purchase of insurance to instead offer
consumers the choice of purchasing insurance or paying a tax. The joint
dissent by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito accused the Chief
Justice's opinion of essentially rewriting the statute and creating a tax
that Congress had not authorized: "In the name of restraint, it overreaches." Whether the specific criticisms ofthe Chief Justice are correct
or not, the furor over his opinion illustrates the danger of Thayerian
judicial restraint: In the justices' eagerness to respect Congress, they
might displace it.
Advocates of Thayerian judicial restraint frequently cite the gravity
of judicial review as the basis for their caution. They quite rightly point
out that the consequences of judicial review are sobering: An unelected
group withdraws a question from popular deliberation, determining
what the nation must or must not do. The ability to override this judicial
decision is limited, even for those who do not believe that the judiciary
is the final word on the meaning ofthe Constitution.
All true. But this focus on the dangers of striking down popular
enactments is one-sided. It minimizes the obligation to enforce the sovereign will — and the perils of failing to do so. The judiciary cannot
write new limits and rights into the Constitution, but neither can it
overlook its obligation to protect the limits and rights that are in the
text. Thayerian judicial restraint admirably hesitates before overruling
the people's representatives, but hesitation must not become abdication.
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If judicial review is ultimately justified by the judiciary's mandate to
enforce the boundaries the people have written into the Constitution,
then that justification is undermined just as much by the unwillingness to guard those boundaries as it is by the invention of new ones.
Advocates of Thayerian judicial restraint are correct when they counsel
humility, but, by setting the bar for unconstitutionality as high as they
do, they ignore the mission given to them by the people. Humility becomes hubris.
Thayerian judicial restraint is therefore self-defeating in that it undermines the basis for judicial review. If the Court believes a law is
unconstitutional, then it must strike the law down, even if the law is not
indisputably unconstitutional. To do otherwise is to undermine the
will of the popular sovereign, and it is that will that authorizes judicial
review in the first place. A Thayerian approach to restraint risks aggrandizing power to the judiciary, all while disclaiming robust judicial
authority. The conservative legal movement has largely left the extreme
judicial restraint of Bork's era behind, and it was right to do so.
LIBERTARIAN ACTIVISM

The decline of Thayerian judicial restraint has coincided with the rise of
aggressive libertarian theories of judicial review, and it is these theories
that have forced legal conservatives to decide whether judicial restraint
should have a prominent role in their movement's future. Libertarians
and conservatives have always had an uneasy relationship within the
conservative legal movement, as they have had in the broader conservative political coalition. Libertarians never quite signed on to Thayerian
judicial restraint, and until recently most libertarians would probably
have considered themselves non-originalists. They would have followed
Judge Richard Posner or Professor Richard Epstein in advocating theories that give freer rein to their political philosophies.
The ascendancy of libertarianism within the conservative legal
movement can probably be traced to the New Federalism decisions
of the Rehnquist Court. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court signaled a
willingness to re-examine the limits on federal power that had been
significantly loosened during the New Deal. In the 1997 case Printz v.
United States, for instance, the Court held that the federal government
could not commandeer state officials to carry out federal law. Similarly,
in 1995's United States v. Lopez and 2000's United States v. Morrison, the
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Court made clear that there were real restrictions on the federal government's power to regulate the economy under the commerce clause.
Both libertarians and conservatives had been calling for this kind
of re-evaluation of the so-called New Deal settlement for decades, but
the Rehnquist Court's New Federalism decisions were particularly encouraging for the libertarian wing ofthe conservative legal movement.
Libertarians saw the Court's newfound willingness to constrain federal
power as an invitation to redefine right-leaning constitutional doctrine
along libertarian lines. That kind of project would require the Court to
take an especially active role in policing the boundaries of federal power
in the economic and regulatory spheres. When Bork wrote "Neutral
Principles," he compared Lochner with Griswold to showcase what he
saw as unprincipled exercises of judicial power, and the conservative
legal movement largely agreed with him. Now that the Court was back
in the business of taking limits on federal power seriously, libertarians
began calling for a return to Lochner-erz jurisprudence.
The most important figure in the rise of libertarian theories of judicial review has been Georgetown professor Randy Barnett. It was
Barnett who argued the 2005 case of Gonzalez v. Raich before the
Supreme Court in an effort to further restrict the scope of Congress's
powers. He is also widely acknowledged to have been the intellectual
force behind the constitutional challenges to the recent health-care law
that culminated in NFIB v. Sebelius.
Barnett has developed a theory that purports to weld originalism
to aggressive judicial review. He contends that the only basis for loyalty to the Constitution is that it is procedurally just: The procedures
it requires are likely to ensure that laws are ''necessary to protect the
rights of others and.. .proper insofar as they do not violate the preexisting rights of the persons on whom they are imposed." Because Barnett
believes the Constitution sets up procedures that meet these criteria, he
thinks we must preserve the procedures by remaining faithful to the
text's original meaning.
Barnett is also a pre-eminent scholar of the Ninth Amendment,
and he has concluded that the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's privileges or immunities clause enshrine judicially enforceable unenumerated rights in the Constitution. Herein lies the key
concept that aligns Barnett's theory with libertarianism: the so-called
presumption of liberty.
77

NATIONAL AFFAIRS • FALL

20/3

To protect the unenumerated rights of the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments, Barnett would have courts presume that most challenged
federal laws are unconstitutional. He writes that the presumption
"places the burden on the government to establish the necessity and
propriety of any infringement on individual freedom." A law is only
proper if it prohibits wrongful action or regulates rightful action, and
it is only necessary if "there were no less restrictive alternatives to the
liberty-restricting means that were chosen." This second requirement
is borrowed from current First and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and is a hallmark of strict scrutiny, a constitutional test that laws
rarely pass.
Barnett's theory provides an intellectual framework that many libertarians and conservatives now embrace, and, in the contest for the
future of the conservative legal movement, the presumption of unconstitutionality is the greatest competitor to judicial restraint of any variety.
There is nothing restrained about Barnett's judiciary. Not only does his
theory spurn deference to popular enactments, it presumes most are invalid. Skepticism of legislative majorities replaces skepticism of judicial
power. For Barnett, there is no counter-majoritarian difficulty; it is the
tendency of majorities to infringe on liberty that is the difficulty.
Barnett offers legal conservatives a tempting bargain: Now that they
constitute a significant portion of the federal judiciary, they could give
effect to their skepticism of governmental authority using the judicial power — all while claiming fidelity to the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Legal conservatives of Bork's era would have rejected the
deal out-of-hand. Today's conservative legal movement must do the same.
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW

The most basic tenet of American constitutionalism holds that no
branch of the federal government may act without constitutional authorization. The states may act unless the Constitution forbids it, but
the federal government is limited to the powers granted to it by the
Constitution. This bedrock principle is made clear by the text of the
Tenth Amendment and is perhaps the most celebrated characteristic of
our Constitution among libertarians, including Barnett.
The presumption of unconstitutionality violates this core principle.
Conservatives and libertarians must not forget that the theory of enumerated powers extends to the judiciary. Like the President or Congress,
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the federal courts must trace their actions to a source of positive law
and, ultimately, to the Constitution itself Indeed, the Court has recognized this principle in several landmark cases. In the pivotal 1938 cast Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, for instance, the justices dramatically restricted
the power of federal courts to create federal common law, the kind of
judge-developed law that state courts—which are not bound by the federal doctrine of enumerated powers—routinely elaborate. The justices
did so, in part, because "no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts." For the same reason, federal
courts have an obligation to ensure that they have jurisdiction over a case
before hearing it: The federal courts have no power to hear cases beyond
what the Constitution and the Congress have authorized.
There is significant evidence that the enactors of the Constitution
understood and expected that the judiciary would have the duty to
enforce the Constitution through judicial review—along with the attendant power to strike down unconstitutional legislation. But nowhere
does the Constitution expressly provide for this power. The judiciary's
authority to declare laws unconstitutional is therefore an inferred one.
Although he certainly did not invent judicial review. Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury contains the traditional justification
for it: If the Constitution is higher law than ordinary statutes, and the
Constitution and a statute conflict, then the judiciary must give eflFect
to the Constitution. But notice that Marshall's rationale permits judicial
review only where there is a conflict between constitutional and statutory law. In the absence of such a conflict, there is no basis for invaliding
a statute, since the court can resolve the case before it without exercising this form of the judicial power. Justice Scalia, dissenting from the
Court's opinion in the 2013 Defense of Marriage Act case. United States
V. Windsor, made this point incisively: "[Judicial review] is not only not
the 'primary role' of this Court, it is not a separate, free-standing role at
all. We perform that role incidentally—by accident, as it were—when
that is necessary to resolve the dispute before us." Judicial review, then,
is a necessary implication of the Court's role in resolving controversies
between litigants, but, where a dispute does not bring the Constitution
and a statute into conflict, judicial review is unauthorized.
Barnett's presumption eliminates the need to demonstrate a conflict
between the Constitution and a statute. By assuming that a statute that restricts freedom in any way is unconstitutional, this theory presumes that
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the judiciary has authority to strike that law down. The mere assertion
of unconstitutionality is sufficient where the government has not shown
"the necessity and propriety of any infringement on individual freedom."
Where does the judiciary derive the power to strike down a law the
unconstitutionality of which has not been proven? Perhaps Barnett
would point to the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, arguing that
they require judges to enforce unenumerated rights. But as Barnett concedes, even his interpretation of these amendments does not require the
adoption of his presumption of unconstitutionality. The presumption is
a jurisprudential test he created to implement the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and judges could just as easily choose another test if they
agreed with his interpretation of those amendments.
The Constitution does not authorize judges to strike down a law unless they believe the law is in conflict with the Constitution. Barnett's
presumption amounts to an unconstitutional power grab by the
judiciary, permitting it to do what no other branch ofthe federal government may do: act without constitutional warrant. The presumption of
unconstitutionality certainly keeps the political branches within limits,
but it ignores the problem of keeping the judiciary itself within limits. If, as Barnett says, judges are the watchmen of our constitutional
boundaries, who is watching the watchmen? Barnett's theory abolishes
a foundational limit on judicial power in order to limit majoritarian
power. It trades one leviathan for another, less accountable one.
AN ORIGINALISM FOR THE PEOPLE

Where does this leave the conservative legal movement? With Thayerian
judicial restraint rejected on the one hand and libertarian judicial aggressiveness rejected on the other, what remains? The answer is the
conservative legal movement's familiar anchor: originalism.
The guiding principle of conservative legal thought should be that
the judiciary will strike down laws that, in the courts' best judgment,
violate the original meaning of the Constitution. Thayerian judicial restraint is thus inappropriate, but so, too, are judicial actions that go
beyond what the document's original meaning supports.
Of course, the extent to which this principle restricts judicial review depends on one's theory of originalism. It would be ridiculous,
for instance, to say that the Supreme Court can strike down a law only
when it can find historical evidence that this kind of law was considered
80

JoelAlicea • RealJudicial Restraint

unconstitutional by those who enacted the constitutional provision at
issue. The Court does not need to provide proof, for instance, that the
founding generation considered the constitutionality of the thermal
imaging of houses without a warrant (to borrow the facts of the 2001
case oiKyllo v. United States) in order to rule on such a case. Clearly, the
principles embodied in the text of the Fourth Amendment are what
matter in a case like Kyllo.
Sometimes, however, the language of a text can be consistent with
a variety of principles. For example, does the establishment clause of
the First Amendment forbid a national church, any interference with
state churches, or all government action that supports religion? These
are very different principles, and all of them—with varying degrees
of plausibility—could be read into the language of the establishment
clause. But the relevant question is which principle did the people
place in the Constitution? For that, judges must resort to historical
evidence of how the people understood the text. Only then will the
judiciary operate within the confines of the power delegated to it by
the popular sovereign.
This principle captures the concept of judicial restraint, properly understood. True restraint acknowledges that judicial authority ends at
the limits of original meaning. Real judicial humility recognizes that
a judge's primary obligation is to the will of the popular sovereign as
manifested in the Constitution's original meaning, and that failing to
enforce that will is an act of judicial abdication or, worse, hubris. Judges
owe the people their best judgment about the original meaning of the
Constitution and its application to particular cases—nothing more and
nothing less.
This view of restraint is more consistent with Bork's theory than
is Thayerian judicial restraint. If Bork was right that the legitimacy
of judicial review depends on the Court's balancing of majority and
minority tyranny, then why tip the scale in favor of majority tyranny?
Likewise, why side with Barnett and tip the scale in favor of minority
tyranny? Why not keep the scale where the Constitution—that is to say,
the people—set it? If judicial review is justified by the judiciary's role in
enforcing the sovereign will of the people, then its authority extends
only as far as the sovereign will has commanded. Equally important,
however, is the judiciary's responsibility to enforce that will when, in the
Court's best judgment, the current majority has violated it.
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Recovering a proper understanding of judicial restraint is essential to
the future ofthe conservative legal movement. Legal conservatism stands
at a crossroads. Having largely rejected Thayerian judicial restraint,
it can choose to abandon its intellectual heritage and embrace the judicial aggression of libertarian theories of judicial review, or it can opt for
the path that is more true to the concerns that called it into being. It can
champion real judicial restraint.
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